This is still vulnerable to the reverse ontological argument, No ?
1. Possibly, God doesn’t exist.
2. Necessarily, if God exists, then it is necessary that God exists.
3. (Hence) It is necessary that God doesn’t exist.
If God is necessary then it exists in every possible world, therefore if it's possible that God does not exist then it does not exist in every possible world.
If the possibility of a necessary entity were simply an assumed premise, it could be challenged by a reverse symmetry argument asserting possibly it doesn't exist. However, if its possibility is reached as a sub-conclusion based on prior reasoning, that serves as a symmetry breaker, so there would need to be a refutation of the reasoning that led to the sub-conclusion rather to assert the opposite.
I'm sure you're already aware, but a modally necessary being's existence in one possible world entails existence in all worlds, including the actual world, according to S5 modal logic.
I disagree. (1) is reached via deductive argument, making it sound so long as the premises are true. They both cannot be sound, so (1*) isn't sound. Would you agree that (1) and (1*) cannot both be sound since it would entail a contradiction if both were sound?
“4.If all existents are either contingent or necessary, then in a metaphysically possible world with only a single non-brute conditionally dependent MCE, at least one MNE with conditional influence (or causal power) instantiates.”
I don’t see how this follows, there is either A or B therefore there is at least one C.
If what exists is either necessary or contingent why should we accept that there is at least one MNE that exists and must instantiate in any given world.
Premise 4 is question begging.
So my point remains why should we accept (1) and not (1*).
Parody argument:
1. A conditionally dependent existent requires an external condition (factor, cause or circumstance outside itself) to actually exist or have reality in the world.
2.If all existents are either contingent or necessary, then in a metaphysically possible world with only a single dependent MCE, no MNE instantiates (since the MCE can be explained by an infinite regress of contingent causes or brute facts).
3.Therefore, in a metaphysically possible world with only a single MCE that is also conditionally dependent, no MNE instantiates.
Step (2*) misses the point, because in (4), only one MCE has ever existed, so there could not be a chain of contingent things. Brute facts are not a third modal category from contingent and necessary. A brute fact could be modally contingent or modally necessary, no? In the definitions (1) and (2), it allows for them to be brute.
If all existents are either contingent or necessary, then in a metaphysically possible world with only a single dependent MCE, no MNE instantiates (since the MCE can be a brute fact)
Parody argument aside, why should we accept that there is at least one MNE that exists and must instantiate in any given world ,if what exists is either necessary or contingent why should we accept.
If something (brute existent) is true in every world, there must be a (principle) why it's true in every world.
What justifies this ?
Things can be brute in a pattern across worlds without there being a higher-order rule or principle that enforces it.
This is still vulnerable to the reverse ontological argument, No ?
1. Possibly, God doesn’t exist.
2. Necessarily, if God exists, then it is necessary that God exists.
3. (Hence) It is necessary that God doesn’t exist.
If God is necessary then it exists in every possible world, therefore if it's possible that God does not exist then it does not exist in every possible world.
Thus, it is necessary that God doesn’t exist.
If the possibility of a necessary entity were simply an assumed premise, it could be challenged by a reverse symmetry argument asserting possibly it doesn't exist. However, if its possibility is reached as a sub-conclusion based on prior reasoning, that serves as a symmetry breaker, so there would need to be a refutation of the reasoning that led to the sub-conclusion rather to assert the opposite.
I'm sure you're already aware, but a modally necessary being's existence in one possible world entails existence in all worlds, including the actual world, according to S5 modal logic.
I am not sure there is any symmetry breaker.
(1) and (1*) seem to be epistemically on par. Why should we favor one over the other.
Moreover, if you don' already accept that God exists, you won't accept that (1) is more likely without a symmetry breaker.
Therefore from (1*) we could construct a parody argument that results in God's non existence.
(1) At least one modally necessary existent (MNE) with conditional influence or causal power instantiates in a metaphysically possible world.
(1*) Possibly, a modally necessary existent doesn’t exist.
I disagree. (1) is reached via deductive argument, making it sound so long as the premises are true. They both cannot be sound, so (1*) isn't sound. Would you agree that (1) and (1*) cannot both be sound since it would entail a contradiction if both were sound?
“4.If all existents are either contingent or necessary, then in a metaphysically possible world with only a single non-brute conditionally dependent MCE, at least one MNE with conditional influence (or causal power) instantiates.”
I don’t see how this follows, there is either A or B therefore there is at least one C.
If what exists is either necessary or contingent why should we accept that there is at least one MNE that exists and must instantiate in any given world.
Premise 4 is question begging.
So my point remains why should we accept (1) and not (1*).
Parody argument:
1. A conditionally dependent existent requires an external condition (factor, cause or circumstance outside itself) to actually exist or have reality in the world.
2.If all existents are either contingent or necessary, then in a metaphysically possible world with only a single dependent MCE, no MNE instantiates (since the MCE can be explained by an infinite regress of contingent causes or brute facts).
3.Therefore, in a metaphysically possible world with only a single MCE that is also conditionally dependent, no MNE instantiates.
Step (2*) misses the point, because in (4), only one MCE has ever existed, so there could not be a chain of contingent things. Brute facts are not a third modal category from contingent and necessary. A brute fact could be modally contingent or modally necessary, no? In the definitions (1) and (2), it allows for them to be brute.
Yes you are right.
I could change (2*) to this :
If all existents are either contingent or necessary, then in a metaphysically possible world with only a single dependent MCE, no MNE instantiates (since the MCE can be a brute fact)
Parody argument aside, why should we accept that there is at least one MNE that exists and must instantiate in any given world ,if what exists is either necessary or contingent why should we accept.
I still think (4) is problematic.
I mostly agree, just replace “god” with “logic”