Argument from objective morality

Last revised: 06/02/25

These are in progress and subject to revision. Feedback welcomed.
The subpoints provide further clarifying thoughts or definitions.

Presuppositions

1. Self-contradictions cannot take place or be true.

2. An objective, non-relativistic moral standard correctly describes moral reality, although I present an argument for an objective moral standard linked here.

   1. An objective non-relativistic moral standard moral framework is universally true, independent of subjective opinions, cultural norms, or relative perspectives. For example, such a standard might hold that certain actions (e.g., justice or compassion) are inherently good or valuable across all contexts, regardless of human beliefs or practices. This is a claim about the about the existence of objective normative truth in the moral domain.

   2. “Objective” refers to stance-independence.

   3. “Perfect” refers to satisfying all of an appraiser’s values.

   4. Values are those things an agent acts to gain or to keep, regardless of the motivation why agent acts to gain or keep them.

3. The argument uses the S5 axiom of modal logic. In S5, all possible worlds are accessible from each other. If something is possible, then it is possible in all possible worlds. If something is necessary, then it is necessary in all possible worlds.

   S5 also includes the principle that if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary. This follows from the idea that possibility and necessity apply across all possible worlds without restriction.

   The modality used is metaphysical possibility. A proposition is metaphysically possible if it is not logically contradictory and follows from necessary truths and nature of things. For example, “a triangle has three sides” is necessarily true in all possible worlds, while “a triangle has four sides” is not possible in any.

Premises

1. Either an actual perfect moral exemplar possibly exists, or an actual perfect moral exemplar is impossible.

   1. A perfect moral exemplar is an agent who fully embodies or adheres to a true moral a standard of goodness.

2. Assume for reductio that an actual perfect moral exemplar is impossible.

3. If true, then no agent can fully embody or adhere to a true moral a standard of goodness, even in principle.

4. If true, then goodness of a kind has an inherent limit.

5. Therefore, assuming that an actual perfect moral exemplar is impossible, goodness of a kind has an inherent limit. (Hypothetical Syllogism on #2-4)

6. If a quantifier has goodness of a kind if and only if it has being, then goodness and being itself are convertible.

7. A quantifier has goodness of a kind if and only if it has being itself.

8. Therefore, goodness and being itself are convertible. (Modus Ponens on #6-7)

9. If existence itself has an inherent limit or could be limited, then it is possible for something to exist beyond or outside of being itself.

10. It is not possible for something to exist beyond or outside of being itself.

11. Therefore, being itself has no inherent limit nor could be limited. (Modus Tollens on #9-10)

12. If true, then goodness of a kind has no inherent limit.

13. Therefore, goodness of a kind has no inherent limit. (Modus Ponens on #11-12)

14. Therefore, assuming that an actual perfect moral exemplar is impossible, goodness of a kind, which has no inherent limit, has an inherent limit, which is a contradiction. (Definitional Substitution on #5 & #13)

15. Therefore, the assumption that an actual perfect moral exemplar is impossible is false. (Reductio ad Absurdum on #2 & 14)

16. Therefore, an actual perfect moral exemplar possibly exists. (Disjunctive Syllogism on #1 & #15)

17. Either an actual perfect moral exemplar is a qualitatively unlimited being or a qualitatively limited being.

18. Assume for reductio that an actual perfect moral exemplar is a qualitatively limited being.

19. A qualitatively limited being is an imperfectly virtuous being.

    1. A being that is finite in its attributes, such as power, knowledge, or moral capacity, are incomplete, inconsistent, or subject to error or deficiency.

    2. Limited knowledge may lead to moral errors (e.g., acting unjustly due to incomplete information). A finite being cannot have omniscient knowledge of all relevant facts, consequences, or moral implications of their actions. Without complete knowledge, they might make morally incorrect choices due to ignorance, even if they intend to follow the standard. A perfect moral exemplar would need to have access to all relevant information (or be structured such that their actions inherently align with the standard) to ensure perfect adherence.

    3. Limited power may prevent acting virtuously in all cases (e.g., inability to prevent harm despite good intentions).

    4. Limited moral capacity may result in inconsistent or incomplete moral behavior (e.g., succumbing to temptation or bias).

    5. Imperfect virtue does not mean the being is wholly unvirtuous or morally bad; rather, its virtues are incomplete, inconsistent, or subject to limitations due to its finite nature. Finite beings rely on their subjective faculties (perception, reasoning, emotions) to interpret and act on moral principles. These faculties are inherently limited and shaped by their finite nature, making their actions mind-dependent to some degree.

20. Therefore, assuming that an actual perfect moral exemplar is a qualitatively limited being, a perfect moral exemplar is an imperfectly virtuous being. (Definition Substitution on #18-19)

21. An actual perfectly virtuous being is a an actual perfect moral exemplar.

    1. Since the actions of a perfect moral exemplar aren’t swayed by external factors like cultural differences or personal preferences, the actions of a perfectly virtuous agent must remain mind-independent. Perfect virtue is necessary for this possibility, as an imperfect exemplar would not fully embody the standard in all possible worlds. A perfectly virtuous being, by contrast, can exist in a possible world where it consistently aligns with the standard and remains unaffected by contingent facts.

22. Therefore, assuming that an actual perfect moral exemplar is a qualitatively limited being, then a perfectly virtuous being is an imperfectly virtuous being, which is a contradiction. (Definition Substitution on #20-21)

23. Therefore, the assumption that an actual perfect moral exemplar is a qualitatively limited being is false. (Reductio ad Absurdum on #18 & #22)

24. Therefore, an actual perfect moral exemplar is a qualitatively unlimited being. (Disjunction on #17 & #23)

25. Therefore, a qualitatively unlimited being possibly exists. (Definitional Substitution on #16 & #24)

26. A qualitatively unlimited being is what we mean by “God.”

27. Therefore, God possibly exists. (Definitional Substitution on #25-26)

28. If true, then God exists in all possible worlds, including our own.

29. Therefore, God exists in all possible worlds, including our own. (Modus Ponens on #27-28)