Argument for objective morality through natural reason

Last revised: 05/02/24

These are in progress and subject to revision. Feedback welcomed.
The subpoints provide further clarifying thoughts or definitions.

Simplified argument

One’s existence is of value to one’s self. (Steps #1-10)

One's existence is logically entailed to achieve or maintain all other goals or ends, and there is no value logically prior to it. (Steps #11-13)

If something of value is logically entailed to achieve or maintain all other goals or ends, and there is no value logically prior to it, then one ought or should act to achieve or maintain that thing of value. (Step #14)

Therefore, one ought or should achieve or maintain one’s existence, which entails one ought cherish one’s self. (Step #15-24)

If there is a goal or end logically entailed that one ought or should achieve or maintain, and there is no goal or end logically prior to it, then that goal or end is an objective standard of moral value, a mind-independent normative measure against which goals or ends can be evaluated. (Step #25)

Therefore, one’s existence is an objective standard of moral value. (Step #26)

If true and no one has a greater claim of moral value or authority over another, then people’s standard of value is of equal consideration. (Steps #27-30)

Therefore, people ought to cherish all other people as they cherish themselves. (Steps #31-32)

The Good is the fullest realization of one’s self, which one ought to cherish. (Steps #33-34)

Therefore, one ought to cherish The Good. (Step #35)

Full argument

1. If a thing receives what it lacks in a certain respect, then that thing is ontologically perfected in that respect.

   1. In other words, when something gains some aspect of what it needs to perform what it's disposed to do, it becomes more complete or more realizes its nature.

2. Actualization is the process through which a thing receives what it lacks in a certain respect.

3. Therefore, if a thing is actualized, then that thing is ontologically perfected in that respect. (Definitional Substitution on #1-2)

4. The act of being is the principle by which things are actualized.

   1. The act of being is the reason or principle why a thing transitions from mere possibility to actual existence, making something real and present, rather than just a possibility.

5. Therefore, if a thing receives the act of being, then that thing is ontologically perfected in that respect. (Definitional Substitution on #3-4)

6. Whatever perfects a thing is ontologically good for a thing, including a person.

   1. Goodness is that which fills or completes what would otherwise be a lack in something’s proper functioning, nature or form. The idea is that what is good promotes instead of frustrates the nature of a thing. To know what counts as a thing’s proper functioning, you need to know what kind of thing it is and what its powers are for. An objective account of proper functioning aims to describe reality, not impose a view on it. Proper functioning can be inferred from repeated observation and reasoning about what something tends toward when fully unimpeded and undisturbed.

7. Existence is how the act of being is instantiated in a particular thing.

   1. One’s existence as a person is understood as a particular instantiation of being that supports rational, conscious life, which develops a personal identity over time. That development (e.g., thinking, experiencing and reflecting) is not one’s existence but the mode in which that existence is actualized over time.

8. Therefore, existence is ontologically good for a particular thing, including a particular person. (Hypothetical Syllogism on #6-7)

9. If something is ontologically good for a particular person, then it is of ontological value to that person's self.

   1. A value is that which one acts to achieve or maintain.

   2. The predicate “is of value” indicates the subject contributes to one’s goals or ends. In this case, one’s existence contributes to each and every goal or end a person’s pursues. I defend how even self-sacrificial goals or ends and self-harm require one's existence in the notes to Step #12b.

   3. Evil is not a substance with an ontological status but a lack of due good. A corrupt will exists (good) but lacks moral order (evil). A disease exists as a biological entity (good) but causes a privation of health (evil). Its existence does not negate convertibility, as evil is parasitic on good. Suffering exists as a psychological state (good), but its negative value arises from a privation of well-being.

   4. In a person, “existence” refers to the being that supports rational, conscious life.

   5. The “mode of existence” refers to how a person’s being is actualized through thinking, experiencing and reflecting.

   6. A “person’s self” refers to the totality of a person’s identity and experiences, which would include one’s mind or conceptual faculty. The thinking self (mind, consciousness) interprets and makes sense of experiences. The experienced self (identity, personal history) provides the context that shapes thinking. Our ability to reflect on our experiences gives rise to a sense of continuity and identity over time.

10. Therefore, one’s existence is of ontological value to one’s self. (Modus Ponens on #8-9)

11. If a thing of ontological value to one’s self is the precondition to achieve or maintain any other goal or end, and there is no goal or end that can be achieved or maintained otherwise, then that thing of value is logically entailed to achieve or maintain all other goals or ends, and all other goals or ends are subordinate to it, as all other goals or ends depend on it for their realization.

12. There is no goal or end for one to achieve or maintain without first existing.

    1. While various goals or ends enhance or diminish the quality or meaning of one’s existence, all other values are ultimately dependent on existing in the first place. All other alternatives or states of being a person confronts are contingent on one’s existence. A fundamental goal or end is one that serves as the foundation for all other goals or ends. Without it, no other goals or ends can be realized. If you didn’t value your own existence at all (even implicitly), then choosing to act would make no sense. The act depends on you continuing to exist long enough to do it. So by acting, you affirm that continuing to exist is, at minimum, better than not existing, for the sake of that act.

    2. Even pursuing critically important values at the risk of pain or a shorter lifespan are ways of contributing to the quality or meaning of one’s existence, so one way of adding to the quality of one’s self may be to engage in life-threatening or sacrificial self-destructive acts. One’s existence is not just a snapshot of the present moment but a continuum that includes the past, present and future. One’s existence is not limited to their current or future self but includes their past self and the choices made throughout life. Certain self-sacrificial acts would be ways to contribute to the quality or meaning of one’s existence, even if they come at the cost of the duration of one’s own life.

13. Therefore, one's existence is logically entailed to achieve or maintain all other goals or ends, and all other goals or ends are subordinate to one’s existence. (Modus Ponens on #10-12)

14. If true, then one must achieve or maintain that logically entailed thing of ontological value in order to act intentionally.

    1. To achieve one's existence does not mean causing one's own instantiation but fully actualizing one's existence. One's self is a part or a person's existence as a rational, conscious being over time. Improvement to one’s self (like moral growth, better reasoning, deeper understanding) doesn’t add to one’s existence in the sense of making one more existent. A person don’t become “more real” by improving. Instead, improvement of one's self makes one's existence more fully actualized. You move closer to what your kind of being is capable of. One's potential becomes more realized.

15. Therefore, one must achieve or maintain one’s existence in order to act intentionally. (Modus Ponens on #13-14)

16. If true, then the performance of intentional acts implies the inherent desirability of one’s existence, independent of any person or group’s psychological attitudes, appraisals, stqnces or reactions.

    1. “Inherent” means something belongs to the nature of a thing. It's part of it by default. When I say "inherent desirability," I’m saying the desirability comes with existing itself, so just by being, the person has value. The value doesn’t come from the conscious evaluation of an agent. The value or desirability of one's existence is a necessary feature implied by the act of existing, not something learned, caused or added. The inherent desirability obtains independently of the subject's thoughts, attitudes, evaluation or appraisal.

    2. “Inherent desirability” refers to the necessity of one's existence as a prerequisite for performing intentional actions, regardless of external opinions, psychological attitudes,or evaluations by others. This desirability is "inherent" because it stems from the logical necessity of existence for action, not from subjective preferences or external validation.

    3. To act intentionally, one must exist as a conscious agent capable of forming intentions and executing actions. If one does not exist or cannot maintain existence, intentional action is impossible. Intentional acts are typically purposeful, aimed at achieving some goal or fulfilling a desire. By choosing to act intentionally, an agent implicitly affirms the value of their existence, as existence is necessary to pursue those goals. For example, if someone intentionally seeks food to survive, they demonstrate a preference for continuing their existence over non-existence. This suggests that intentional action presupposes a valuation of existence, at least in the context of the act itself.

    4. The inherent desirability of one’s existence can even stand in opposition the stance of the appraiser (one’s self). Even someone currently without intentional goals or ends or seeking to end their biological life, their existence sustains the foundation for potential goals and ends that contribute to their legacy or narrative identity. Even in such cases, the act itself requires the agent to exist at the moment of action, and the intention might reflect a desire for a different state (e.g., relief from suffering), not necessarily a rejection of existence's value in principle.

       If a person acts to end their biological life, their existence still has value in at least one clear way: they must still value something enough to act intentionally toward it.

       To act (even to end life) requires:

       1. Deliberation: They judge one state of affairs better than another.

       2. Intention: They aim to bring about that preferred state.

       3. Agency: They use their will to make it happen.

          All three depend on the person still existing as a thinking, willing subject. The act itself shows they value something (perhaps relief from pain, an escape from shame, or a final statement of control). Even if that value is tied to the end of biological life, their capacity to evaluate, intend and act depends on their current personal existence. Without it, no action is possible. So their existence is still of value, not necessarily in their own eyes as a whole, but as a means for carrying out the act they care about. The act affirms that their existence matters enough to serve that final purpose. In that sense, existence remains instrumentally valuable, even if the person rejects its overall worth exceeds its costs.

17. Therefore, the performance of intentional acts implies the inherent desirability of one’s existence, independent of any person or group’s psychological attitudes or reactions. (Modus Ponens on #15-16)

18. If a thing of ontological value is inherently desirable to an actor and all other goals or ends are subordinate to that thing of value, then one ought or should achieve or maintain that thing of ontological value.

    1. In this context, the "ought" is a directive for behavior that seeks to preserve or secure the very conditions that make other goals or ends meaningful or possible. This "ought" is grounded in the practical necessity of valuing the thing of value (e.g., existence, well-being) as a prerequisite for achieving goals. Importantly, this "ought" is not derived from descriptive facts about the world but arises from the normative relationship between the thing of value and the goals or ends that depend on it. Practical necessity is inherently normative because it involves evaluating actions in light of their contribution to achieving or maintaining goals, which are themselves expressions of what individuals value. This process is meant to deduces what actions are better or more appropriate than others for achieving a given goal or end, and in this case the given goal or end has been deduced by logical inference, not subjective preference or cultural influence.

    2. The normative moral value of one’s existence is ontologically objective because its value doesn't depend on some person or group to have (or be disposed to have) some psychological attitude or reaction towards it.

    3. This method is epistemically objective since the claims are knowable or verifiable through rational, evidence-based methods, regardless of personal biases or subjective perspectives. For instance, the claim "The moon is currently (x) km from Earth" is epistemically objective because it can be verified through scientific measurement and evidence, even though it requires human interpretation, tools, and methods to establish its accuracy.

19. Therefore, one ought or should achieve or maintain one’s existence. (Modus Ponens on #17-18)

20. If "ought" or “should” implies "can" and people have volition, then the principle that one ought or should achieve or maintain one’s existence applies only to living things with volition, like people.

    1. Volition means the capacity to form intentions.

21. "Ought" or “should” implies "can,” and people have volition.

22. Therefore, the principle that one ought or should achieve or maintain one’s existence applies only to living things with volition, like people. (Modus Ponens on #20-21)

23. If one ought or should achieve or maintain one’s existence, then one ought to cherish one’s self.

    1. To cherish means means taking intentional action to seek, achieve or maintain a goal or end.

24. Therefore, one ought to cherish one’s self. (Modus Ponens on #22-23)

25. If there is a goal or end logically entailed that one ought or should achieve or maintain, and there is no goal or end logically prior to it, then that goal or end is an objective standard of moral value, a mind-independent normative measure against which goals or ends can be evaluated.

    1. A moral value is a goal or end one ought or should achieve or maintain.

26. Therefore, one’s existence is an objective standard of moral value. (Modus Ponens on #24-25)

27. If true, then each person’s existence is an objective standard of moral value.

28. If true, then no one has a greater claim of moral value or authority over another.

29. Therefore, no one has a greater claim of moral value or authority over another. (Hypothetical Syllogism on #26-28)

30. If true, then one’s standard of value, which entails to cherish one’s self, is of equal consideration to all others.

    1. If all people are morally equal, this creates a reciprocal relationship where individuals recognize and respect each other’s standards of value.

31. If true, then one ought to cherish all other people as they cherish themselves.

    1. A possible objection is that to cherish one’s self allows for excluding any consideration of others. I would counter that even if a person thought of their existence only in material terms (e.g., health, wealth, power and pleasure), a person who exploits others and suffers no material consequences has still fallen short actualizing their full existence.

       1. Self-alienation: Exploiting others means they treat people as tools, not as ends in themselves. Even if they succeed outwardly, they know (consciously or not) that their gains rest on harm or manipulation. That knowledge undercuts genuine self-respect. They can't take honest pride in what they've built, because it wasn’t built on their own excellence but on the backs of others. This disconnect between how they see themselves and what they’ve done fractures their identity. A person cannot be fully actualized while hiding from or distorting who they are.

       2. Weakened capacities: Even if material goods seem sufficient, a person’s identity still depends on the capacities of reason, conscience and reflection. Exploitation weakens those capacities. It trains the mind to avoid truth and prioritize image over reality. This leads to a diminished self that avoids empathy, which is necessary to form deep trust or love. These are more than just moral or spiritual goods but psychological and relational capacities. Weakening them shrinks what a person is able to be.

       3. Added fragility: Material gains earned through exploitation depend on continued manipulation, secrecy or control. That makes their position unstable. They may have wealth or status, but it rests on fear of being found out or replaced. Their wealth or power is an albatross. This erodes peace and freedom. Even in comfort, they remain defensive. Full actualization requires a freedom from this kind of inner fragmentation and anxiety.

32. Therefore, one ought to cherish all other people as they cherish themselves. (Modus Ponens on #30-31)

33. If the fullest or greatest realization of one’s self is to reach a state of complete actualization, then one ought to cherish that state of being.

    1. To cherish a value, one must cherish what is innate to it.

34. The Good is the fullest act of being, where all potential is actualized completely.

    1. In classical theism, God is The Good.

35. Therefore, one ought to cherish The Good. (Modus Ponens on #33-34)