Modal argument from love

Last revised: 02/03/25

These are in progress and subject to revision. Feedback welcomed.
In the simplified argument, I list the steps of the main argument.
The subpoints provide further clarifying thoughts or definitions.

Simplified argument

A contested entity with a nature that fulfills or satisfies the description of being TETWNMLCBC (G) possibly instantiates if desiring toward goodness (L) is a perfection. (Steps #1a-c)

L is a perfection (Steps #2a-l)

Therefore, G possibly instantiates. (Modus Ponens) (Step #3)

If true, in virtue that L is a perfection without potential or limitation, the non-existence of G is metaphysically impossible in at least one possible world, which entails it must exist in at least one possible world. (Steps 4a-b)

If a state of affairs is metaphysically impossible in at least one possible world, then it is metaphysically impossible in all possible worlds, including the actual world. (Step #5)

Therefore, the non-existence of G is impossible in all possible worlds, which entails it must exist in all possible worlds, including the actual world. (Modus Ponens & Hypothetical Syllogism) (Step #6)

Full argument

Presuppositions

1. Self-contradictions cannot take place or be true.

2. Universals do exist in particular things that are instantiated and in the intellect when abstracted.

   1. For example, if G represents a nature that can be instantiated, then the argument assumes that such a nature is not just a conceptual label but something that genuinely exists in particular things when instantiated. Similarly, if L is a perfection, and perfections are real, then the assumption is that abstracted concepts have a basis in reality.

   2. An abstract concept like "perfection" exists in the intellect as a universal, but it’s not presumed that “perfection” exist as a concrete, individual thing in the here and now. Universals are instantiated in particular things (like humanity in humans) and exist as concepts in the intellect when abstracted.

   3. A separate argument against nominalism with regard to universals is linked here.

3. The argument uses the S5 axiom of modal logic. In S5, all possible worlds are accessible from each other. If something is possible, then it is possible in all possible worlds. If something is necessary, then it is necessary in all possible worlds.

   S5 also includes the principle that if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary. This follows from the idea that possibility and necessity apply across all possible worlds without restriction.

   The modality used is metaphysical possibility. A proposition is metaphysically possible if it is not logically contradictory and follows from necessary truths and nature of things. For example, “a triangle has three sides” is necessarily true in all possible worlds, while “a triangle has four sides” is not possible in any.

Premises

Definition: TETWNMLCBC is that entity than which nothing more loving can be conceived.

1. 1. If desiring toward goodness (L) constitutes love, then a contested entity with a nature that fulfills or satisfies the description of being TETWNMLCBC (G) possibly instantiates if L is a perfection.

      1. This argument employs metaphysical modality by considering what is possible or necessary across all comprehensive ways reality could be. Metaphysical possibility applies to an entity or state of affairs that (a) is free from logical contradiction and (b) conforms to eternal or necessary truths, such as the requirement that a triangle must have three sides and cannot have four.

      2. “Goodness” means ontological perfection or a thing’s fulfillment of its nature, not merely moral perfection.

      3. “Contested entity” means an entity whose ontological status as to whether it actually exists (or a referent can be described as it) is in dispute or being argued.

      4. “Constitutes” means to be considered as something.

      5. "Exemplifies" means to illustrate or demonstrate a quality or characteristic in the same sense that a unicorn exemplifies or possesses the defining characteristic of one-hornedness, even if unicorns are not real.

      6. “Possibly instantiates” means that there is a possible way reality could be in which G is present.

      7. “Perfection” refers to a maximal or ideal attribute or property, which is necessarily possible because they are by nature purely great-making and cannot entail contradictions. If a property entails no internal contradiction and does not conflict with other properties of a coherent, possible world, then it is metaphysically possible. While there may be logically possible entities that could not coexist with an all-loving being, perfections themselves, including L, are metaphysically possible as long as they do not conflict with other perfections. The possibility of L and the maximal instantiation of love can coexist because they do not inherently contradict other good qualities but actually build upon them.
         Physical attributes or properties (having a specific shape, size or location in space) are subject to spatial or physical constraints and could always be greater or improve. By contrast, perfections are maximally instantiated, purely great-making, and metaphysically possible with or without spatial or physical constraints.

   2. L constitutes love.

      1. If love is willing or seeking the good of another, then love is not merely an emotion but an active disposition. It involves recognizing what is good and intentionally desiring or bringing it about.

   3. Therefore, G possibly instantiates if L is a perfection. (Modus Ponens on #1a & #1b)

2. 1. Assume for reductio that L is not a perfection.

   2. If L is not a perfection, then that implies a potentiality or limitation to goodness.

      1. Suppose L is not a perfection, then a being could be "fully good" without having any inclination toward the good. This would imply a potential state of greater completeness in which goodness does include an orientation toward itself. Then goodness could exist in two states: one where it actively desires goodness and one where it does not. This distinction introduces potentiality, meaning that goodness could either remain static or move toward a more complete state of goodness (where it also desires itself). However, true perfection is fully actual, not something that could exist in a more complete state than it already does. So, if L is not a perfection, we would have a form of goodness that could be better, meaning it is not maximal, so it has potentiality or limitation.

   3. Therefore, assuming L is not a perfection, that implies a potentiality or limitation to goodness. (Modus Ponens on #2a & #2b)

   4. Actual existence is ontologically good for whatever it makes real.

      1. Actual existence refers to existence that is fully realized and complete. It contrasts with potential existence, which is a state of being that could exist but has not yet actualized or become real or fully realized. Actual existence is what makes something real and capable of fulfilling its nature.

      2. Evil is not a substance but a lack of due good. A corrupt will exists (good) but lacks moral order (evil). A disease exists as a biological entity (good) but causes a privation of health (evil). Its existence does not negate convertibility, as evil is parasitic on good. Suffering exists as a psychological state (good), but its negative value arises from a privation of well-being.

   5. If actual existence is ontologically good for whatever it makes real, then something has goodness if and only if it has actual existence.

   6. Therefore, something has goodness if and only if it has actual existence. (Modus Ponens on #2d & #2e)

   7. If true, then goodness and actual existence are convertible or interchangeable.

      1. A being is good to the extent that it fully actualizes what it is meant to be according to its nature. If goodness and being are interchangeable, then evil cannot be a substance but must be a privation, like how darkness is to light.

      2. “Convertibility” means each term implies the other or is interchangeable.

   8. Therefore, goodness and actual existence are convertible or interchangeable. (Modus Ponens on #2f & #2g)

   9. If true, then L converts to desiring toward actual existence (E).

   10. Therefore, if E is not a perfection (convertible with L), then that implies potentiality or limitation to actual existence. (Modus Ponens on #2h & #2i)

   11. Actual existence is without potentiality or limitation.

       1. Actual existence represents the fullest, most complete form of being.

   12. Therefore, E is a perfection, which entails L is a perfection. (Modus Tollens on #2j & #2k)

3. Therefore, G possibly instantiates. (Modus Ponens on #1c & #2l)

4. 1. If true, in virtue that L is a perfection without potential or limitation, the absence or non-existence of G is impossible in at least one possible world.

      1. Perfections (e.g., love, goodness, existence) are properties that admit no intrinsic limits. If a perfection instantiated but were subject to external constraints or limitations, that would imply a deficiency in its nature, which is contrary to being perfect.

   2. Therefore, the absence of G is impossible in at least one possible world. (Modus Ponens on #3 & #4a)

5. If a state of affairs is metaphysically impossible in at least one possible world, then it is metaphysically impossible in all possible worlds, including the actual world.

   1. Necessary truths (and their corollary impossibilities) apply to all possible worlds.

6. Therefore, the absence of G is metaphysically impossible in all possible worlds, including the actual world. (Modus Ponens on #1c & #5a)