Argument for the causal principle

Last revised: 05/15/25

These are in progress and subject to revision. Feedback welcomed.
The subpoints provide further clarifying thoughts or definitions.

Presupposition

1. Self-contradictions cannot take place or be true.

Premises

1. Either all composite existents have a cause or not all composite existents have a cause.

   1. “Composite” refers to being made up of parts arranged in a given way (e.g., physical objects, organisms, or systems). The parts could consist of physical parts, metaphysical parts (if they exist), or both. Composition doesn’t mean that the whole depends solely on a specific arrangement of those parts. The key idea is that composition describes the relationship between parts and the whole they form, but the identity or existence of the whole may not always hinge on a precise, fixed arrangement of those parts.

   2. “Existent” refers to an entity, being, or thing that has actual presence in reality. It would not include abstract objects.

   3. “Cause” refers to a principle upon which the existence or characteristics of something depends. A cause isn't necessarily deterministic in the sense that it produces only a single effect. Some but not all causes are deterministic in the sense that they are both ontoligically prior and logically sufficient to produce a given effect.

   4. “Principle” refers to a fundamental source or origin from which something proceeds or upon which something depends for its existence.

2. Assume for reductio that not all composite existents have a cause.

   1. A universe can be composed of various entities, but its identity as a universe doesn’t necessarily depend on a specific arrangement of these entities.

   2. A company, community or team is composed of individuals, roles and resources. However, the group’s identity doesn’t depend on a specific arrangement of its members, but it does presuppose some part of it exists.

3. If true, then some composite existents are not caused by the arrangement of its parts.

4. Composite existents are dependent on the arrangement of its parts coming or remaining together.

   1. The premise implies that without this some arrangement, the existent would either not exist or cease to exist as that particular entity. Composition implies that the whole is not identical to some parts; the whole exists only because the parts are organized into a unified structure. This organization (whether physical or metaphysical) is what the existent depends on. Dependency arises because the parts are distinct (ontologically or physically) and could fail to be arranged correctly without some process or principle ensuring their unity. Therefore, the whole’s existence is not guaranteed by the mere existence of the parts, since it requires their arrangement, even if not in that specific arrangement.

   2. A universe is not dependent on an arrangement of specific parts, but it is dependent on some parts. In this sense, a universe is dependent upon and presupposes its parts, even if a higher mode of being could emerge from those parts.

   3. As applied to energy, energy subsists through and depends on matter or fields. Energy is also composed of these distinct metaphysical parts:

      1. Act and potency: Energy’s actualized forms vs. its potential (e.g., stored energy).

      2. Essence and existence: Its nature as a capacity for work vs. its instantiation in systems.

      3. Form and matter: Its dependence on systems (fields or matter) vs. the substrate or underlying substance it affects.

   4. As applied to a hypothetical non-abstract space manifold that contains no spatially extended objects, dimensions, time, logical constraints (rather than logical constraints be grounded in its being), causal structures (in the sense of internal complexity or creaturely causal relations), governing laws (in the sense of external rules or principles that control it), or geometry, then it would still consist of distinct metaphysical parts, including act and potency plus essence and existence.

      1. Act and potency: Its current state as a unified, continuous spacetime vs. its potential to contain particles, fields or events.

      2. Essence and existence: It's essence (what distinguishes it as a specific entity) is distinct from its existence since it doesn't actually exist.

5. Therefore, assuming not all composite existents have a cause, then some composite existents, which are dependent on the arrangement of its parts, are not caused by the arrangement of its parts. (Definition Substitution on #3-4)

6. Existents are not caused if and only if they are not dependent on the arraignment of parts.

   1. Reliance on something else would imply a cause (e.g., whatever organized the parts or maintained their configuration). Depending on parts implies causation, since the some principle organized their arrangement. If we claim that the whole itself causes some parts to be unified, this creates a problem: the whole relies on the parts being arranged, while the arrangement of the parts relies on the whole. This leads to a circular dependency, as it would mean the arranged whole must exist before some parts to bring them into arrangement, which is a contradiction.

   2. Consider a theoretical entity whose parts are so essential to its nature that they are always arranged correctly. However, emergent properties are typically understood as dependent on the underlying physical structure, which is caused (e.g., by biological or physical processes). Emergent properties, like consciousness emerging from brain activity, might appear to challenge the premise, as they rely on the organization of parts but don’t seem directly “caused” in a simple sense. However, these properties are generally seen as dependent on the underlying physical structure, which is itself caused (e.g., through biological or physical processes). The premise still holds: the emergent property presupposes or hinges on the arrangement of parts, and its existence is indirectly caused through the causal history of those parts.

7. Therefore, assuming not all composite existents have a cause, then some composite existents, which are dependent on the arrangement of its parts, are not dependent on the arraignment of some parts, which is a contradiction. (Definition Substitution on #5-6)

8. Therefore, the assumption that not all composite existents have a cause is false. (Reductio ad Absurdum on #2 & #7)

9. Therefore, all composite existents have a cause. (Disjunctive Syllogism on #1 & #8)

   1. This does not guarantee that a composite existent has a beginning. It could be the case that a composite existent is timeless, but nonetheless caused.